The debate over constitutional reform in Armenia has become one of the key stumbling blocks in the peace process with Azerbaijan. While Yerevan’s leadership insists that constitutional changes are part of its domestic agenda rather than the result of external pressure, Baku has repeatedly argued that the Armenian Constitution contains territorial claims against Azerbaijan that must be removed if a sustainable peace agreement is to be signed.
Armenia has not committed to amending its Constitution as part of the agreements with Azerbaijan. Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated this in an interview with Public Television. He also mentioned that he does not agree with the Azerbaijani view that there are issues within the Armenian Constitution:
"The issue of the Constitution was not discussed in Washington, although we have previously heard statements about this from Azerbaijan. We also observe problems in their Constitution, but we believe a peace agreement can resolve these issues without requiring amendments...
Armenia has not agreed to amend its Constitution at the request of any country. We have been discussing the possibility since 2018, and only a section related to the Declaration has been added to these talks."
Last year, N. Pashinyan announced plans to adopt a new constitution, and he reaffirmed these plans last week. He even mentioned that if there are any discrepancies, he would intervene to accelerate the process.
What are the reasons behind these disagreements in Yerevan? What do they suggest about the future of the peace agreement? In such a scenario, could Azerbaijan include claims to its historical lands, specifically Western Azerbaijan, and propose adding clauses about the return of these territories to its Constitution, as well as demand the immediate evacuation of Yerevan and other territories due to the expiration of the lease?
Azernews sought insights from leading political experts in Azerbaijan.
According to Ilyas Huseynov, Senior Advisor to the Center for Social Research and a Political Scientist, if Armenia resists the amendments, Baku may consider reciprocal constitutional measures that introduce claims to historical lands or escalate diplomatic and legal pressure:
“The Armenian constitution must be changed without any condition. Azerbaijan’s demands must be met here. Because this constitution contains territorial claims against Azerbaijan, and only if those claims are removed can a peace agreement be signed. Unfortunately, the agreements reached in Washington are presented to the domestic audience by Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan in a completely different form, which is certainly unacceptable. Because Armenia has taken on obligations at the request of the Azerbaijani side, and these are also related to the amendment of the Constitution.
I believe that such a statement by Ararat Mirzoyan is calculated to protect the image of the Armenian delegation before the domestic audience. The Armenian Constitution will undoubtedly change. However, they are trying to present it in such a way that this is not being fulfilled at the request of Azerbaijan, these changes are related to the country’s ‘European integration’. It will hold a referendum based on the priorities it has put forward.
However, even if Azerbaijan’s demand is met in these changes, it will not be conveyed to the domestic audience as our pressure on Armenia. Because parliamentary elections will be held in Armenia next year, the ruling party will show its strength, successes and achievements over the past period.
In one form or another, I think that changing the constitution in the context of official Baku's demands is a must. Otherwise, the Azerbaijani side can also take adequate steps. It can make constitutional amendments, add the issue of Western Azerbaijan to its constitution on a legal level. Its demands can increase and become tougher, and the Armenian side should not forget that Azerbaijan leased Yerevan and other territories. It can appeal to international instances, citing the expiration of its term. In short, Azerbaijan has enough arguments to present to the Armenian side. It would be better for Azerbaijan to take steps against Armenia within the framework of its current demands, because history and the processes taking place in the near future show that after its demands are not met, our subsequent demands become more consistent, and in this case, of course, it can implement all options.”
Moscow-based political analyst Andrew Korybko, on the other hand, warns that continued ambiguity in Yerevan’s stance could complicate regional dynamics, particularly as Azerbaijan pursues its own integration strategies through the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP):
“Azerbaijan's demand that Armenia amend its constitution to remove references to what was once known as ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’ as the final prerequisite for a peace treaty has divided Armenian society. The newly announced ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’ (TRIPP) has been similarly contentious. Those who oppose both believe that they represent unacceptable concessions of Armenian sovereignty that could possibly presage the de facto re-erasure of their state.
The Foreign and Prime Ministers might be sincere in their respective stances of opposing and supporting such an amendment, or they might be playing a game of ‘good cop, bad cop’ whereby they speculatively already agreed to push through this amendment but want to manage public opinion first. Whichever it may be, this rhetoric will predictably cause concern in Azerbaijan that Armenia might either only partially implement the Washington Pact or possibly renege on it in the future.
It’s possible that Azerbaijani-Armenian relations can normalize even in the absence of a peace agreement, upon which the associated amendment is required, so long as TRIPP becomes operational. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, obtaining more direct access to Nakhchivan and thenceforth Turkiye and beyond is a priority since it’ll position the country as one of Eurasia’s geo-economic pivot states for connecting East (China, Central Asia) and West (EU), so it might use TRIPP even without a peace treaty.
From Armenia’s perspective, if it continues to refuse to amend its constitution in the way that’s demanded (or it tries to via a failed referendum), politicians (whether from the ruling party or the opposition depending on the aforesaid scenario) can claim that they ‘saved Armenia’s sovereignty’. Either way, while the issue is certainly significant due to what that part of the current Armenian Constitution implies, TRIPP might help them normalize their relations even without a peace treaty.
If Azerbaijan includes amendments in its constitution that mirror Armenia’s implied claims to neighboring land, that could imperil the peace process and lead to negative media attention from the West (with whom Azerbaijan is attempting to enter into a rapprochement) even though it has the right. Such a move might only be done if TRIPP doesn’t enter into operation for whatever reason and Armenia continues to refuse to amend its constitution in the way that’s demanded.
If bilateral relations normalize through TRIPP even in the absence of a peace treaty and Azerbaijan suddenly signals interest in this move, then it could spook Armenia into fearing that Azerbaijan might seek to advance such similarly implied claims via military means. In that scenario, the US would likely have to mediate between them, especially if Armenia then expresses newfound reservations about continuing TRIPP’s operations in such a tense political context. Once again, Azerbaijan has the full legal right to amend its constitution however it wants, but the context in which that might happen could lead to the opposite reaction from Armenia than might be expected.”