The European Union has embarked on a new trajectory with the launch of its ReArm Europe programme, signalling a historic rise in military spending and industrial expansion. By 2030–2031, EU defence allocations are projected to reach unprecedented levels, potentially up to €2 trillion. This policy marks not only a military build-up but also a fundamental reindustrialisation of Europe, with governments seeking to involve private companies, expand defence production, and reduce reliance on both the United States and China. Certainly, the presence of Russian "Shahed" drones in Polish airspace last night has heightened concerns among European nations.
This ambitious strategy could reshape the continent’s security architecture, revive Europe’s industrial base, and alter social dynamics within member states. But it also raises important questions about stability, geopolitics, and whether Europe risks repeating historic patterns of militarisation.
To what extent will this reduce Europe’s dependence on the United States for security guarantees? What does this armament tell us about the future of the Ukrainian war? What does this mean for the war in Ukraine itself? How realistic is it for Europe to reduce its reliance on Chinese industrial supply chains while scaling up defence production?
Talking to Azernews, Sebastian Schaeffer, Director at the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM), sees ReArm Europe as a pivotal initiative but warns that its success hinges on genuine coordination. “ReArm Europe is a serious step towards turning the often-abstract idea of strategic autonomy into reality. By combining procurement, industrial planning, and financing, the programme has the potential to make Europe less dependent on external suppliers and more capable of acting on its own. But success will depend on real coordination across member states — otherwise, large sums could still be spent in fragmented national silos rather than creating genuine European capacity.”
One key debate is whether this programme will reduce Europe’s reliance on the United States for security guarantees. Schaeffer notes that while progress can be made, Washington’s role remains indispensable. “ReArm can certainly reduce dependence in some areas, particularly when it comes to ammunition, platforms, and supply chains. It strengthens Europe’s ability to contribute more to its own defence. However, NATO’s command structures, intelligence sharing, and nuclear deterrence still tie Europe closely to the US. So, while this programme narrows dependencies and increases Europe’s leverage, it cannot replace the full spectrum of US security guarantees overnight.”
On Ukraine, Schaeffer stresses that Europe is preparing for a long-term struggle rather than betting on a swift peace. “The scale of rearmament shows that European governments are preparing for a long-term challenge rather than banking on a quick settlement. There is strong reluctance to accept a ceasefire that would leave Russia with territorial gains, as that would effectively reward aggression. At the same time, positions within Europe vary — some argue for exploring pauses in fighting tied to credible guarantees, while others warn this would only allow Moscow to regroup.”
His assessment carries a warning for policymakers: “Without a just peace, there will be just peace. Meaning that if we do not find a permanent solution based on justice, the hostilities will flare up again. A ceasefire will maybe end the war temporarily, but there will almost certainly be another war coming in 5–10 years. This is something that we need to prepare for.” He adds that Russia shares this long-term perspective, though for different reasons, fearing Ukraine could use any pause to rearm and reclaim occupied territories.
A final challenge lies in reducing Europe’s dependence on China, particularly for industrial supply chains. Schaeffer sees progress but emphasizes the long road ahead. “It is possible, but it will take time and come at a cost. Europe has already launched initiatives to mine, process, and recycle more critical raw materials at home, and diversification is underway. But China still dominates many mid-stream inputs, so full independence is not realistic in the short term. What we can expect is gradual de-risking — more stockpiles, more partnerships with trusted suppliers, and more investment in European capacity — rather than an instant break from China.”
He also points to political leadership as essential for sustaining this shift. Referring to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech, he highlights her message that Europe is “under attack” and must invest now in its security. “Even if it comes at a cost now, the cost of being unprepared is disproportionately higher,” Schaeffer concludes.
ReArm Europe is therefore both a promise and a test. It offers the chance to strengthen Europe’s autonomy and resilience, but without unity, foresight, and credible security guarantees, it risks repeating past cycles of militarisation. As Schaeffer reminds us, peace in Ukraine and Europe’s long-term security depend not only on weapons, but on ensuring justice and avoiding a future in which today’s ceasefire becomes tomorrow’s war.
