Against the backdrop of growing instability in the Middle East, Azerbaijan’s recent gas deliveries to Syria via Türkiye mark an important precedent — both in terms of energy policy and geopolitics. What goals is the new Syrian leadership pursuing? What role does Azerbaijan play in this process? And is it technically and politically feasible for Russian gas to reach the Middle East through the South Caucasus? News.Az discussed these and other key questions with Igor Yushkov, Leading Analyst at the National Energy Security Fund and an expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation.
– On August 2, Azerbaijan began supplying natural gas to Syria via Türkiye. To what extent is this development geopolitically significant for the entire Middle East, and could it signal a new phase in the region’s energy policy?
– Yes, without a doubt, this is a major development—primarily for Syria itself. The new leadership of the country is seeking to show both its domestic population and international players, particularly the EU and the U.S., that it is taking constructive steps: restoring the energy system and acting in the interests of its citizens. They are signaling that they are here to stay. Their main task now is to stabilize the situation, gain external support and recognition, and create both domestic and international confidence that Syria’s political chaos has come to an end.
Restoring the energy infrastructure is a critical step in this direction. Before the civil war, during the 2000s and early 2010s, Syria was self-sufficient in oil and gas. While it was never a major producer by regional standards and lacked large reserves, it could meet its domestic needs. The country’s power grid was based primarily on gas- and fuel oil-fired power plants.
Today, even to ensure minimal functioning of industry and public services, stabilizing electricity supply is essential—and for that, gas is necessary. It is currently impossible to quickly restore production from domestic fields, as this would require repairing pipelines and rebuilding infrastructure. Therefore, importing gas from abroad in the short term is the most logical step.
There are only a limited number of realistic gas suppliers. Türkiye is a major importer, not a producer, which makes Azerbaijan and Iran the key external sources. However, Iranian involvement is unlikely due to strained relations with Syria’s new leadership. This makes Azerbaijan the most viable option.
Most likely, the supply scheme works as follows: Azerbaijani gas is delivered to Türkiye, where it is purchased by traders or state-owned companies, and then exported to Syria. Türkiye, as Syria’s neighbor, is interested in stabilizing the country for both political and economic reasons. Ankara seeks to build positive relations with the new Syrian leadership and strengthen its influence in the region. From an economic perspective, even selling gas at cost or at a discount could benefit Türkiye by supporting Syria’s energy recovery.
The restoration of electricity will send a powerful message to Syrian society: life is returning to normal, and the country is stabilizing. This could help attract investment, revive industry (even on a small scale), and generally support economic growth. Without electricity, none of this is possible. A stable energy supply could also encourage foreign companies to participate in resource development, as Syria still possesses various natural resources.
In short, this is a serious step forward for Syria. In the long run, of course, the goal is to restore domestic gas production and achieve energy independence—but that’s still a long way off.
– Given the new route for Azerbaijani gas supplies to Syria via Türkiye, is there a technical and political possibility for transporting Russian gas to Syria through Azerbaijan, for example via TANAP or alternative corridors? Would Russia be interested in this?
– The key issue here is volume and economic viability. When it comes to deliveries through the TANAP–TAP corridor to Europe, Azerbaijan’s priority remains the European market. It offers the highest margins, stable payments, and favorable conditions for exporters. It is therefore logical that Azerbaijan aims to maximize deliveries to Europe, where it already has long-term contracts in place: 6 bcm for Türkiye, 1 bcm each for Bulgaria and Greece, and 8 bcm for Italy.
The development of Shah Deniz-2 has significantly boosted Azerbaijani gas production, and the country is now reaching a stable output level. Surpluses are typically directed to the Balkan markets—for instance, last year, SOCAR supplied Bulgaria with 2 bcm instead of the contracted 1 bcm. Given this, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan would allow TANAP capacity to be used for Russian gas. That would create direct competition and could lower market prices—something that would be economically disadvantageous for Baku.
The situation with Syria is different. Alternative routes could be used, bypassing TANAP–TAP. Azerbaijani gas can reach Türkiye via other pipelines, with Turkish traders or state entities delivering it to Syria—either directly or via proxy schemes. Russia, in turn, is interested in any solvent market. But Syria poses several challenges.
First, logistics: for Russia to supply gas to Syria, it would need to transport it through Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkiye, and finally into Syria. Each transit leg adds costs, making the final price potentially too high.
Second, payment capacity is a major issue. In the initial stages, barter schemes are more likely. For example, Syria might pay for gas with crude oil from its domestic fields, even though production has fallen sharply due to war damage. Some resources still remain. So, Syria might pay for Azerbaijani or Turkish gas with oil, especially since imports will likely not exceed 2 bcm per year initially.
With Russia, the situation is more complicated. Syrian oil is of little interest to Moscow, and offering credit is difficult given Russia’s own economic constraints and the politically cautious approach toward Syria’s new leadership. Unlike Türkiye, Russia is still carefully building ties with the post-Assad authorities, remembering their past conduct and links to violent episodes.
So, direct Russian gas deliveries to Syria are unlikely in the near term. Theoretically, a scheme similar to the Azerbaijani one could work—if Turkish companies purchase Russian gas at market rates and resell it to Syria. In that case, the end-user matters less; what’s important is that the Turkish intermediary is financially solvent.
Additionally, Russia has more efficient routes. For example, the Blue Stream pipeline, running directly from Russia to Türkiye, is sometimes underutilized. For Gazprom, it would be more cost-effective to use this pipeline than more expensive transit through multiple countries en route to Syria.
In sum, Russian gas exports to Syria are constrained by economics, politics, logistics, and payment risks. As it stands, Azerbaijan is positioned to benefit most, with Türkiye serving as the key intermediary.
– How would you assess the prospects for energy cooperation between Russia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Syria amid Western sanctions and a changing global gas market?
– Technically, there are no sanctions specifically targeting Russian pipeline gas. However, U.S. restrictions do apply to Russian LNG projects—especially new ones involving technology, transportation, or financing.
When it comes to potential LNG deliveries to Syria, several technical and political barriers arise. Syria currently lacks its own LNG terminal. In theory, this could be solved by leasing a floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) and connecting it to the country’s gas grid. That would allow imports of Russian LNG, particularly from Yamal or Sakhalin—two projects not under heavy U.S. sanctions.
Still, problems remain. These projects are already selling LNG at market prices. Whether the new Syrian leadership can afford those prices is questionable—and unlikely.
As for sanctioned Russian LNG, which might be offered at a discount, the prospects are also limited. Syria’s new government is trying to rebuild ties with Western countries, including the U.S., and is unlikely to violate sanctions on Russia. The political and reputational risks outweigh any economic gains. Therefore, despite the potential mutual benefit, deliveries of sanctioned Russian LNG to Syria are improbable.
Infrastructure issues must also be considered: building or leasing an LNG terminal, integrating it into the national grid, and ensuring logistics would all require time, investment, and political will.
As for routes through Azerbaijan and Türkiye, challenges persist. Russia and Azerbaijan are direct competitors on the gas market. Baku is unlikely to support transit of Russian gas—whether to Europe, Türkiye, or Syria. Azerbaijan is actively expanding its own gas production and will seek to use its infrastructure to further its national interests.
Azerbaijan likely has not yet reached its peak production potential. In the coming years, it will be assessing how much more it can export and working to solidify its position in international markets. Under these circumstances, opening its infrastructure to Russian gas would run counter to its strategic goals.
Therefore, under current geopolitical conditions, the prospect of multilateral energy cooperation among Russia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Syria—what might be called a “quadrilateral format”—remains very limited. Russia continues to enjoy strong energy ties with Türkiye, where it remains the top gas supplier. With Azerbaijan, cooperation takes different forms. But full coordination of energy flows among all four countries is highly unrealistic in the foreseeable future.
